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REGULATION HAS EVOLVED OVER TIME 
Given that actors and activities in the financial 
sector constitute a “public good,” and are prone 
to excesses, banks and capital markets are 
regulated. In the United States during 1930s, and 
much earlier in some other countries, financial 
activities were segregated to prevent risk 
contagion, and limit conflicts of interest. Until 
the 1980s, banks, brokers and other financial 
intermediaries were numerous, and most had 
“single functions.” After the 1980s, the lessons 
of the financial scandals and crashes of the 
1920s were gradually forgotten; the single 
function became less mandatory. Some large, 
even mammoth, “universal banks” appeared in 
both Europe and (to a lesser extent) in the US.  
Today, “universal banks” in Europe often carry 
out a large number of activities, including 
commercial banking (deposit-taking and 
lending), brokerage of securities and investment 
funds, and investment banking (issues of 
securities, arbitrage and speculation in capital 
markets). They are big and have a dominant 
share of savings and dominate the field of 
financial intermediation. The largest universal 
banks often adopt collusive behaviour that in 
many sectors leads to price manipulation, which 
leaves little room for competition. 
European governments are now providing 
guarantees for bank liabilities for aggregate 
amounts that are often larger than the official 
public debt and even the Gross National 
Product (GNP). Belgium for instance, 
guarantees at around €400 billion worth of bank 
deposits and other debt (more than its 
This Policy Brief discusses a few simple 
measures to improve both the 
commercial and investment banking 
landscapes, with or without formal 
separation. Covering deposits with 
quality collateral would make them 
safer and would help create an easier 
guarantee and resolution mechanism at 
the larger eurozone level. Strong central 
counterparties and transparency 
requirements would improve market 
mechanisms and market discipline in 
capital markets and investment 
banking. Specific governance measures 
would also help improve the financial 
sector. Finally, a better control of bank 
solvency, together with improved 
capital market transparency and 
accessibility, should encourage the 
progressive deleveraging of commercial 
banks, and enhance the long term 
funding of the economy by capital 
markets. 
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€380billion GNP) with substantial risk. There is 
no lack of savings in Europe, and certainly not 
in Belgium, yet businesses in many European 
countries are complaining that their access to 
bank financing is difficult at times. 
European banks are encouraged to invest a large 
part of their assets in government bonds, which 
could crowd out private lending and create what 
is called a “deadly embrace.” Banking crises and 
public finance crises feed off of one another, 
creating a downward spiral that can be difficult 
to stop. Banks would not have to fund 
governments or large corporations if capital 
markets in Europe were sufficiently opened.  
FINANCE HAS BECOME VERY BIG 
The share of financial firms in both the US 
economy and many European economies has 
grown from 2-3% of GDP in the 1980s to 8-
10% of GDP today, which could either mean 
that there has been a vast creation of added 
value and satisfaction or an enormous reduction 
in cost-efficiency, oligopoly rents, and a kind of 
“financial tax” levied on the economy. The 
added value of banking is not obvious, and is a 
debate on its own. At any rate, we can say that 
modern financial services come at a very high 
cost, and are very risky.  
Regulating the “mammoth” banks and the 
complicated financial products and markets that 
accompanied them is very difficult, to say the 
least. The boards of directors of large universal 
banks have long shown that they are often not 
in control of market activities, and it now 
appears clear that oftentimes top management is 
not in control of these activities either. 
Regulators cannot be expected to control risk 
more effectively than management or boards of 
directors. Therefore, simply advocating for more 
regulation of the same banks and same capital 
markets might sound redundant.  
Any reform of the banking sector in Europe 
should bring simple but radical changes, and 
lead to regulatory controls that can be easily 
implemented. It should chiefly aim to 1) reduce 
the risk of bank failure and its impact on both 
the depositors and states that guarantee the 
deposits, and on the system as a whole; 2) 
improve the efficiency (by reducing the cost of 
intermediation and improving the quality of 
allocation) of capital markets in terms of 
channelling savings towards the economic 
agents who need and deserve financing. 
SEPARATING POORLY FITTING 
ACTIVITIES  
The principle for simple solutions is well known, 
and proposed by many politicians, academics, 
independent observers, and even previous 
defenders of the "deregulated big universal 
banks" model, such as former Fed Chairman 
Alan Greenspan and retired CEOs of some of 
the largest banks in the world. In essence, the 
integration of various activities within a 
universal bank is inefficient and dangerous, 
which is why big banks should be replaced by 
separate entities that specialize in some activities 
and have fewer internal conflicts of interest.  
In practice, insurance and banking should be 
separated. They are different businesses, and do 
not mix well. Commercial banking should be 
separated from investment banking, and then 
rigorously and more simply regulated. Such 
regulation should include implementing 
adequate limits to lending policies, risk 
concentration, and minimal capital buffers. Bank 
expansion beyond a certain size should be 
discouraged, and even taxed. For investment 
banking activities, brokerage and investor 
advising should be separated more clearly from 
securities origination and issuer advising, as the 
two are obviously in conflict. 
Stricter competition rules should also be 
enforced both in banking and in capital markets 
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in order to reduce the present concentration of 
power.  
But let us be realistic. If European governments 
have not yet been willing or able to act together 
to achieve these goals (in spite of the magnitude 
of the 2008-2013 crisis), they are unlikely to act 
effectively soon. The US government and 
regulators are now taking serious measures to 
reform their banks and capital markets, and the 
UK is starting to reform its banking sector by 
isolating commercial banking from market risk 
taking. On the European continent, however, 
there is not much movement. Any attempts at 
reforming the system are blocked by the 
banking lobby, which has been successful at 
convincing French and German governments 
that any measure that limits the speculative zeal 
of mammoth European banks is an Anglo 
Saxon plot to harm the Deutsche Bank or BNP 
Paribas and benefit Goldman Sachs and the 
bedevilled “hedge funds.”  
SOME TRANSITORY AND OTHER 
REFORMS ARE NEEDED IN ANY CASE 
 The measures proposed henceforth are 
alternative measures to be applied in case the 
reforms listed above cannot be decided upon 
quickly. However, most of these alternative 
measures would be useful in any type of banking 
architecture. Some of the rationale for these 
proposals—such as the lack of evidence of 
economies of scale in commercial banking 
(above a modest level), or the uncommon 
advantages size is giving to a few investment 
banks and universal banks that can abuse 
markets and get away with it—have been 
analyzed and documented in academic studies, 
producing diverse diagnoses and 
recommendations. 
Protect deposits better 
Many universal banks are directly or indirectly 
using cheap, state guaranteed client deposits to 
engage in risky market and financial activities, 
and to leverage their balance sheets. They often 
give seniority and other privileges to their 
counterparts in those activities. This puts 
depositors in a de facto junior (or subordinate) 
position, and puts taxpayers at great risk. The 
credit flow, which many of these banks do not 
consider a priority, has been reduced in many 
countries, while the cost of credit has increased.  
A simple reform measure could bring a lot of 
good. Banks collecting deposits should be 
requested to protect depositors with full 
collateral cover, as is used in case of covered 
bonds. This collateral should consist of 
diversified loans for the economy at large (i.e. 
loans to individuals, corporations, public sector, 
etc.), and should be progressively expanded until 
100 percent of deposits are covered. This should 
not discourage lending to the economy. In fact, 
the state guarantee that is currently and 
generously given to any bank should in the 
future be reserved for banks that can give 
acceptable loans to the economy as collateral. 
These “covered deposits” would be rather easy 
to define and no more difficult to manage than 
“covered bonds,” which have recently multiplied 
in Europe.  
Commercial banks that do not give privilege to 
creditors, have sufficient equity, and have a 
reasonable lending policy that is monitored by 
the regulator could be exempt from the 
obligation to collateralise their deposits. All 
other banks, however, should adequately cover 
their deposits, for example those that give more 
than 10% of their assets in collateral. This would 
simply mean providing their depositors with a 
pari passu (meaning “equivalent standing”) clause 
comparing all creditors, something banks 
themselves request when they lend to their own 
clients, especially those whose equity buffers are 
considered too low. 
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A way towards a pan-European guarantee 
mechanism, or even a Banking Union 
A deposit guarantee and resolution mechanism 
could be based on specialised agencies called 
National Deposit Insurance Companies 
(NDIC), under the (optional) umbrella of a 
European Deposit Insurance Company 
(EUDIC) that intervenes if and only if the 
NDIC have correctly applied the rules (e.g. have 
adequately checked the quality and diversity of 
the assets in the collateral). The cost of insuring 
deposits should be defined in relation to the risk 
profile of each bank and each collateral 
portfolio. It should be paid by banks to the 
NDIC, which would pay the EUDIC a premium 
for the reinsurance it provides. 
This would probably be a very good way to 
facilitate a banking union at European level. The 
logic of a banking union is to have a common 
supervisor (the European Central Bank), a 
common resolution mechanism, and a common 
deposit guarantee scheme. Achieving it in that 
order would be very difficult, because Member 
States –the ultimate risk takers in the system – 
are not sufficiently informed about the 
associated risks. Starting with deposits and the 
protection of deposits would probably be more 
promising. 
Large universal banks can be expected to resist 
such a scheme. In most European countries, the 
compensation the state receives guaranteeing 
deposits is much lower than the market price for 
such a guarantee would be. Moreover, this 
current scheme does not discriminate in terms 
of risk; the more risky banks pay the same as the 
less risky ones. This guarantee on banks’ 
liabilities thus amounts to a subsidy; the weaker 
the liability, the bigger the subsidy. It is not 
surprising, therefore, that some banks are 
weakening the status of their depositors by using 
their best assets as collateral for other forms of 
financing (such as covered bonds and 
repurchase agreements) and market transactions, 
since this weakening is not reflected in the price 
they pay to guarantee those deposits, and thus 
the government subsidy gets higher.  
Addressing systemic risk by using central 
counterparties instead of systemic banks 
Derivative transactions include a large part of 
interest rate activities and commodities, and 
many of them involve forward (i.e. future) 
transactions, that are accompanied by long 
settlement risks. 
Bilateral (known as Over The Counter, or 
“OTC”) derivative transactions are concentrated 
within the dominant banks in each market. In 
those bilateral transactions, banks are 
counterparties to each other, and dominant 
banks have very large volumes of counterparty 
contracts, making them “systemic.” The fact 
that Lehman Brothers was such a dominant 
player in OTC derivatives was a major reason its 
bankruptcy created “systemic” problems. 
The largest of these systemic banks are referred 
as SIFIs: Systemically Important Financial 
Institutions. They are often considered to be 
“too big to fail.” For this reason, these 
institutions have received tacit public bail-out 
guarantees and the cheap funding that such 
guarantees provide, which further enhances their 
capacity to dominate and manipulate financial 
markets. It is thus not surprising that these 
dominant banks want to keep the system the 
way it is, even though it does not serve the 
interests of other market participants or 
taxpayers, who unwillingly underwrite it.  
There is another way to organize financial 
transactions like derivatives, namely by 
facilitating centralization through mandated 
centralized exchanges. If this occurs, settlement 
can be done centrally as well. Central 
Counterparties (CCPs) for derivative 
transactions greatly reduce the systemic risk of 
possible bank failure, but any CCP itself should 
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be capitalized at a high level. Some legislative 
steps are being taken in the US, and to a lesser 
degree in Europe, to force banks to clear all 
derivative transactions above a certain level 
through CCPs. These CCPs must be very solid 
and thus highly capitalized, which is an 
argument large banks use against centralization. 
Yet an easy way to do this would be to use the 
proceeds of a (modest) Financial Transaction 
Contribution (FTC) on any derivative 
transactions. This would help create a capital 
buffer within the CCPs. After a while, the 
capitalization of the CCP would be large enough 
to truly strengthen the system. Above a certain 
level of capital buffer within the CCP, the FTC 
could be reduced or eliminated. 
Some may argue that this constitutes a kind of 
Financial Transaction Tax, but even so it is 
perfectly logical, as the proceeds would be used 
to make sure a financial activity pays for risks it 
generates. 
This centralization would bring more security 
and transparency to prices and market practices. 
It is not favoured by the largest market 
participants, who seem to benefit from the 
present lack of transparency. Some large 
industrial companies are also pleading against 
such centralization, which might seem surprising 
since non-bank users of derivative markets often 
pay for the lack of transparency. But it also 
appears that in some large commodity markets, 
large industrial companies have developed 
trading practices that might also  manipulate the 
system. 
Force banks to report on securities lending 
and profitability, and put limits to it 
At the very least, securities lending should be 
made more transparent and less risky. Moreover, 
end-investors should explicitly approve of any 
lending of securities they own directly or 
indirectly, and receive the compensation for it. 
The lending and relending of securities should 
be more controlled, more transparent, and 
prohibited when need be; it might also be safer 
if these transactions went through CCPs. 
Make non-dramatic bank failures possible  
 Governments in Europe have sought to avoid 
large bank failures until now, which has led to 
growing subsidies, moral hazards, and other 
problems. The amount of guarantees given to 
banks is rising, along with the risk for taxpayers. 
As long as banks are not allowed to fail, the 
sector could become more and more 
dysfunctional. The two reasons given to bail out 
banks in Europe are as follows: 1) to protect 
depositors, and 2) to avoid systemic risk to 
market counterparties, or “a new Lehman”. The 
counterparty risk should be greatly reduced by 
the standard application of CCPs in all securities 
and derivative transactions.  
With the generalization of covered deposits and 
CCPs, a bank in difficulty could be reorganised, 
bailed-in by its creditors, or left to fail. Its 
covered deposits and collateral could be carved 
out in an orderly way, under the control of the 
Deposit Insurance Company, and at little to no 
cost and risk to taxpayers. 
Remuneration policy 
Remunerations in banking are far higher than in 
any other sector, and their variable part 
(“bonuses”) is often used to encourage 
recipients to seek profit at all cost. In finance, 
many traders and sales people are in a position 
to make easy money on taking risks, 
manipulating markets to cheat on clients, and 
even cheating the banks themselves. 
Consequently, all of the above happens. A 
typical observer would lament the behaviour of 
dishonest traders and pity the victims on 
Monday, but if the issue of remuneration is 
brought up on Tuesday, they swallow the story 
that high “performance related” bonuses are 
needed to keep “rare talent” in the bank, even 
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though this “performance” is measured through 
rough profit reporting that does not discriminate 
against fraud or excessive risk taking. When 
fraud and excessive risk taking occur, observers 
seem to consider it as inevitable. 
The problem described here is not limited to 
trading rooms. In distribution activities, for 
example, sales people, even at local branches, 
are routinely motivated to sell the financial 
products that are best for the bank, rather than 
those that are best for the clients. This practice 
has continued despite serious evidence of 
misseling, and after the introduction of the 
MIFID (Market for Investment in Financial 
Instrument Directive) which includes rules that 
state that banks have to practice “best 
execution” in favour of clients and avoid 
conflicts of interest.  
We do not have a miracle solution with regards 
to this problem, but making boards of directors 
more transparent and more responsible as is 
hereunder suggested would be a start.  
Increase the responsibilities of members of 
banks’ boards of directors  
The governance of banks could be improved, 
along with the roles and competences of board 
members. 
Remunerations within banks are problematic, as 
they can induce irresponsible behaviour that 
negatively impacts clients, markets, and even 
banks themselves. Boards of directors should 
certify at least once a year that, to the best of 
their knowledge, the remuneration policy and 
practices of the bank are coherent with laws and 
regulations, with a decent behaviour in general, 
and are coherent with the values the bank is 
claiming.  
The board should state that they have examined 
each product sold to retail clients and are 
convinced they are bona fide and a decent value 
for the client. If this looks cumbersome, it is 
probably the best way to limit the proliferation 
of toxic financial innovation, while allowing 
useful financial activities. This is also a way to 
improve the effectiveness of boards. 
Impose a leverage ratio and a real analysis of 
credit risk 
The definition of the minimum equity imposed 
on banks in function of their “Risk Weighted 
Assets” has been perverted. It allows banks to 
work with very low levels of equity, as long as 
they can show that they lend to borrowers with 
high “ratings” or “control” risk with historical 
statistics and models. Yet these models are 
misleading and have perverse consequences to 
the evaluation of credit risk. 
Misleading for market risk 
Value-at-Risk and other models with simple 
indicators are easy to understand, but easy to 
manipulate and prone to “historical bias,” which 
makes them unreliable in terms of defining the 
necessary amount of equity on market activities. 
This was obvious in 2007-2008, when suddenly 
only very few large banks had enough equity to 
withstand the crisis without state support or 
regulatory leniency, or both.  
Universal banks sometimes argue that they are 
no “casino players,” and that their market risk is 
very small compared to their credit risk. 
However, this is often because market risk is 
both poorly measured and underestimated.  
Perverse for lending 
This risk weighted asset approach also negatively 
influences how credit risk is evaluated. It 
encourages banks that concentrate on 
maximizing their return-on-equity (which is the 
vast majority of them) to focus their lending on 
loans that fit into their models, thus enabling 
them to minimize equity needs. Models are 
increasingly used to judge credit risk, and often 
produce very negative effects, both on lending 
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activities and actual credit risk control. This 
might be a significant explanation for the 
financing problems many companies in Europe 
are complaining about. Credit officers and credit 
committees with real experience are, and could 
become again, much more effective and flexible 
than models. 
The risk weighted asset method also encourages 
banks to buy exaggerated amounts of 
government bonds, because they are often 
considered to be zero risk. This illusion 
amplifies banking and public financial crises, 
creating a downward spiral that is also called a 
“deadly embrace,” as one feeds off the other. 
Imposing a leverage ratio (a minimum of equity 
as a proportion of the balance sheet) , and 
returning to a control of lending policies that 
favours common sense and credit analysis 
experience could therefore bring a lot of good. 
It would stop encouraging banks to purchase 
large amounts of government bonds and top 
quality corporate bonds. Yet, we do not need 
banks to finance these borrowers, as they should 
be able to easily finance themselves through 
capital markets. 
Financial intermediation through capital 
markets and other non-bank channels must 
be increased 
If banks are less able and willing to buy 
government bonds or top quality corporate 
bonds that would no longer be characterised by 
“low equity requirements” because of leverage 
ratio requirements, that should be an incentive 
for banks to reduce their balance sheet, and thus 
their equity requirements under a leverage ratio 
model. It should not create a financing problem 
for sovereign or top corporate borrowers, since 
it is the role of capital markets to finance such 
borrowers through bond issues. Yet In Europe 
the “Universal” banking model has not favoured 
the development of open capital markets until 
now, which might thus be another good reason 
to envisage a separation of investment banking 
and capital market activities from commercial 
banking. 
The European economy would probably benefit 
very much from capital markets that take a 
bigger part in the financing of the economy. In 
Europe, most of that activity is today in the 
hands of universal banks 
Long term lending is not the easiest activity for 
banks, since their own funding is very short 
term. In many countries, however, long term 
bank lending has existed for a long time, and has 
even increased in prevalence during the last 
decades, pushing aside more specialized long 
term lenders, and increasing their liquidity and 
interest rate risk. 
Because banks  took too much liquidity risk, 
regulators intend to impose stricter limits on the 
mismatching of maturities, which is already 
benefitting capital markets; a growing number of 
large and medium size companies are now 
tapping bond markets, rather than getting their 
long term funding from banks. This should 
grow in the future and will if retail investors are 
no longer discouraged from investing in such 
securities by tax and distribution limits. To 
facilitate the non-bank long term funding of a 
wider array of borrowers, a number of measures 
should be envisaged: 
- Creating dedicated investment funds that 
would invest in bonds issued by smaller 
companies, as we have seen in the US 
- Facilitating the return of securitization of 
loans, a very useful technique that can help 
banks refinance the credits they provide to 
their clients. With the necessary precautions, 
it can be a good answer to the problem. 
Separating the funding from the credit risk can 
also be envisaged: 
- Long term credit banks characterized by a 
light structure that could provide the funding 
could be resurrected, while commercial banks 
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and other financial institutions, like credit 
unions, provide a credit guarantee 
- The long term funding could be done by 
insurance companies, pension funds, and 
investment funds, while the credit risk could 
be assumed by commercial banks, credit 
unions, and the like. 
Force transparency on investment banking 
activities 
Until the 1990s, investment banks had 
successfully developed capital market activities 
and financial products, and were good at 
managing their risks and controlling their 
activities. Since then, however, investment 
banking activities have grown in volume, and 
the massive “intrusion” of commercial banks in 
their activities and ownership has changed 
significantly. The fact that many market 
activities were so easily funded using easy 
money, and that many of the largest investment 
banks or universal banks became too big to fail, 
probably induced a race to increase size and 
profit at all cost, with the dire consequence that 
we have experienced since 2007. 
Various measures should be taken to efficiently 
reform capital markets, but forcing banks that 
engage in capital markets to pay the normal 
price for their financing—without receiving any 
subsidies from depositor’s money or any form 
of government guarantee— would be a huge 
step in the right direction. 
Stricter limits on the financial activities of 
commercial banks should also limit the 
leveraging capacity of hedge funds. These hedge 
funds are quite good at managing financial risk, 
and should not be held responsible for the 
problems of capital markets, but there is no 
reason that they would get access to subsidised 
funding, directly or indirectly.  
Imposing transparency on capital market 
activities through the centralisation of all 
transactions and their central clearing would also 
go a long way towards improving the market 
discipline, and the capacity of clients and 
regulators to identify market abuses.  
Separating investment banking from broking 
would also be very beneficial for the markets 
and for clients. It has been attempted in the US 
after the many scandals that created the 
“internet bubble” in the early 2000s, but the 
banking lobby was able to resist the separation 
projects. At least a rule preventing the conflicts 
of interest of professional investors and asset 
managers, and making them more responsible 
for remuneration transparency would be a first 
step. To alleviate the concern of clients and 
regulators, banks promised to improve internal 
separation –i.e. “Chinese Walls”– but most of it 
remained quite formal and ineffective. Large 
investment banks are indeed using the 
“synergies” brought by this cohabitation in a 
variety of ways and to a various ends, including 
to gain the “loyalty” of large investors, who like 
a privileged access to primary market 
transactions and useful information. 
CONCLUSION 
A system for protecting deposits that could 
precede a euro-wide guarantee and resolution 
mechanism, in combination with a more stock 
market-like infrastructure to trade and clear 
derivatives (which has proven remarkably 
resilient during crisis), would go a long way in 
reducing systemic risk and governments' need to 
bail out failing banks. This would allow for 
fewer regulatory constraints, and would rely to a 
larger extent on market discipline. 
The adoption of minimum leverage ratios for 
banks would also simplify regulation. Done 
progressively and together with the right 
incentives for capital market development (and 
in consideration of investors' interest in long 
term securities investment), it should encourage 
commercial banks to deleverage by reducing 
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their holdings of government and market-
eligible corporate bonds. These bonds would 
then be easily absorbed by more dynamic capital 
markets and end-investors, in both the 
institutional and retail sectors, who would have 
greater trust in the transparency and reliability of 
these markets. 
Some existing or new institutions might also be 
used to facilitate the comprehensive 
development of a long term funding mechanism 
for the economy, either directly or in addition to 
securitization. The lessons from the 
securitization debacle of 2007 and 2008 should 
be used to drastically improve market practices, 
but the securitization process itself should not 
be condemned. Securitization could be a 
significant part of the solution to the long term 
funding problem, as it helps lenders manage 
both their liquidity and interest rate risks. 
Eric De Keuleneer is Professor at the Solvay 
Brussels School of Economics and 
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